We study partiality in propositional logics containing formulas with either undefined or over-defined truth-values. Undefined values are created by adding a four-place connective W termed transjunction to complete models which, together with the usual Boolean connectives is shown to be functionally complete for all partial functions. Transjunction is seen to be motivated from a game-theoretic perspective, emerging from a two-stage extensive form semantic game of imperfect information between two players. This game-theoretic approach yields an interpretation where partiality is generated as a property of non-determinacy of games. Over-defined values are produced by adding a weak, contradictory negation or, alternatively, by relaxing the assumption that games are strictly competitive. In general, particular forms of extensive imperfect information games give rise to a generalised propositional logic where various forms of informational dependencies and independencies of connectives can be studied.
Introduction
Logical and linguistic partiality can be derived from a variety of sources. It can happen that objects lack definite truth-values because of our partial information about them, or because of a partial nature of objects themselves. Partiality can also be manifest in natural language, where statements will refer to objects only partially, because the semantics of natural language expressions is only partially defined.
Semantics for various logics have been investigated from partial perspective over the years, starting from the partial interpretations of propositional and first-order logics [1] , [2] , [10] , [16] , [18] ; extending to modal logics [7] , [26] ; to generalised quantifiers [8] , [25] ; and to higher-order logics [19] .
In this paper we go back to classical logic and study the phenomenon of partiality arising at the level of complex sentences, by introducing a four-place connective W called transjunction. The resulting logic extended with W turns out to have a functionally complete set of connectives and have the properties of persistence and coherence, but it does not have the property of determinacy.
Rather than taking partial interpretations for granted, we show how game-theoretic semantics motivates the introduction of the connective W . This connective is seen to correspond to a two-stage semantic game of imperfect information between two players, the verifier ∃ (Eloise, Myself) and the falsifier ∀ (Abelard, Nature), where the choice of action by the verifier at the second stage is independent of the choice of action by the falsifier at the first stage. Thus it can be seen how game-theoretic semantics in general accounts for the phenomenon of partiality: partiality is a natural consequence of players' lack of perfect information in a semantic game. Specific forms of imperfect information (and the ensuing property of imperfect recall) will be seen to give rise to different 'informationally independent' propositional logics where various forms of informational dependencies and independencies between connectives can be studied. Not only is partial propositional logic with undefined truth-values endorsed from this game-theoretic viewpoint, but also the close relative of partiality, the property of non-coherence can be seen to receive a game-theoretic motivation in terms of non-strictly competitive games, amounting to non-coherent sentences with over-defined truth-values.
Preliminaries
The basic concept of propositional logic is the notion of signature, which is a (finite) set σ of primitive (atomic) propositional symbols, denoted by the upper-case letters S, S 1 , S 2 , . . .. For a logic L, the set of sentences in σ is L(σ), and it is built up from σ using the classical logical constants ¬ (negation), ∨ (disjunction) and (verum). A subset of σ is a (classical) model, denoted by M , which is a set of true atomic sentences of L(σ). Each connective comes with an arity:
is a nullary or a zeroplace constant, ¬ is a unary or a one-place constant, and ∨ is a binary or a two-place constant.
As such, a model M as well as the elements in L(σ) are total in the sense that each propositional symbol is assigned an interpretation, and so every sentence has a definite truth-value in a set {0, 1}, where 0 means the truth-value false and 1 means the truth-value true. Falsity of a sentence and it being not true are two different things, as are truth of a sentence and non-falsity. However, false sentences are also not true and true sentences are also not false, but non-true sentences do not imply that they are false, and non-false sentences do not imply that they are true.
Starting from L, there are three basic ways of obtaining partial interpretations, where the case of having a definite truth-value no longer holds.
The first way is to have the partiality at the level of atomic sentences, that is, at the level of the signature σ. In this case we would have sentences S ∈ σ that are neither true nor false. This is another way of saying that the models M of L are partial.
A The second way of introducing partiality into propositional logic is by having a lack of truth-values or 'truth-value gaps' originating at the level of complex (non-atomic) sentences. In this case, the models are complete but the object language L is enriched with some new propositional connectives. A trivial way to implement this proposal is to augment the set of classical connectives with a zero-place connective •, and stipulate for any M that • is neither true nor false. Likewise, we could introduce a zero-place connective ¦, and stipulate that ¦ is both true and false in any M . The resulting logic L(•, ¦)(σ) can be shown to be functionally complete for all partial functions, a property which does not generally hold for ordinary propositional logics. The alternative we shall follow in the present paper is to enrich ordinary propositional logic with complex connectives. The resulting logic turns out to have the properties of persistence and coherence, but it does not have the property of determinacy.
The third option is to get partiality as a result of combining the first and the second strategies, namely to have both partial models and new propositional connectives. As expected, the logic is persistent and coherent, but not determined.
Games provide an alternative method of delivering semantics for a variety of languages. In the following pages the phenomenon of partiality in propositional logics will be related to a game-theoretic method of evaluating sentences, with some natural constraints on the admissible information flow within sentences. In this setting, partiality is seen to arise because of imperfect information or the loss of information between the players playing a semantic game on sentences.
Extensions of propositional logic
Let the usual propositional language L(σ) extended with a four-place connective W (ϕ, ψ, θ, χ), denoted by L(W )(σ), be the smallest set of sentences closed with respect to the sentences in σ, the familiar rules for the connectives in the set {¬, ∨, }, and a rule for the new connective W :
The connective W (ϕ, ψ, θ, χ) will sometimes be alternatively written as W (ϕ ij ) i,j∈{1,2} , with ϕ 11 = ϕ, ϕ 12 = ψ, ϕ 21 = θ, and ϕ 22 = χ. However, it is important to keep in mind that ϕ 11 , ϕ 12 , ϕ 21 , and ϕ 22 are expressions of the metalanguage.
Models for L(W ) are pairs
The semantics involves the notions M |= ϕ + (the sentence ϕ is true in M ) and M |= ϕ − (the sentence ϕ is false in M ), and is defined by a double induction on the length of ϕ.
One should notice that the definition of truth and falsity for W (ϕ, ψ, θ, χ) can equivalently be written as: 
One can easily see that the relation of these connectives to W is as follows:
Since the translation for xx is uniform, W is stronger than interjunction. Let the connective W be termed transjunction. Fix a propositional logic L and an arbitrary signature σ. Let ϕ be an L(σ)-sentence and let the models be partial (not necessarily complete ones). By M ⊆ N we mean that
If ϕ is truth-persistent and falsity-persistent then ϕ is persistent. The logic L is persistent, if for any σ, ϕ is persistent in σ. Proof. For coherence, the proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
Let ϕ be W (ϕ, ψ, θ, χ). 
It can be checked, using Definition 3.
The truth-value of the L(W )(σ)-sentence ϕ in the model M is denoted as ϕ M . This function can obtain the following values.
Let ϕ ∧ ψ be defined as a shorthand for ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), ϕ → ψ as ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ ↔ ψ as (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). By Definition 3.1, the truth-tables agree with the usual Strong-Kleene truth tables (cf. [16] ):
In classical logic L, every truth-function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} from a class of models 
Proof. Let f : K → {0, 1, ?}, and define two functions f
By the functional completeness property of classical logic, there are L(σ)-sentences χ and θ such that
The interpretation of negation ¬ makes it strong, positive negation, transforming truths to falsehoods and falsehoods to truths, but not meddling with non-determined values. There is a version of weak, contradictory negation available, defined in the following way. Let L(W, ¬ w ) be L(W ) extended with a contradictory negation ¬ w . Definition 3.1 is augmented with two clauses as follows. 
Having a contradictory negation defines ϕ → w ψ as a shorthand for ¬ w ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ ↔ w ψ as a shorthand for (ϕ → w ψ) ∧ (ψ → w ϕ). The equivalence |= (ϕ ↔ w ψ) + holds when ϕ and ψ are true in exactly the same models, and |= (¬ϕ ↔ w ¬ψ) + holds when ϕ and ψ are false in exactly the same models. The former is called the positive equivalence and the latter the negative equivalence. If both equivalences hold, ϕ and ψ are strongly equivalent, denoted as |= ϕ ψ.
Consequently, it is seen that the presence of weak negation introduces a fourth truth-value. Therefore the interpretation of an L(W, ¬ w )(σ)-sentence ϕ can have the following values.
Equivalently, these definitions give rise to the following truth tables.
One should note that these truth tables are not equivalent to the Strong-Kleene valuations. Also, it is readily seen that L(W, ¬ w ) is persistent (all the models are complete), but that it is neither coherent nor determined.
The next question is whether L(W, ¬ w ) has a functionally complete set of connectives. The answer is affirmative, as shown by the next theorem. Theorem 3.5 Let K be a class of classical models in σ. For any function f :
Proof. Fix f : K → {0, 1, ?, !}, and define two functions f
To prove the claim, observe that for every M , the following equivalences hold:
and θ M = 0, and thus both (not M |= χ
, and thus not (not M |= χ
+ , and similarly any M can be turned into a complete partial model M P = M, σ \ M . Therefore there is a one-one correspondence between the class of classical models and the class of complete partial models.
Let us define by induction two mappings (the truth-preserving mapping) and (the falsity-preserving mapping), which map 
Proof. By a double induction on ϕ. We consider two cases.
Let
The rest of the cases are similar.
The language L(W ) is an extension of L interpreted on complete partial models, and it is persistent and coherent, but not determined. This extension does not add to the set of determined sentences of L, however. Likewise, L(W, ¬ w ) is persistent, non-coherent and non-determined, and it does not add to the set of coherent and determined sentences of L . To see this, fix an arbitrary Proof. Take ψ to be the formula obtained as specified above. Then by Theorem 3.6 one has M |= ϕ Proof. Suppose ϕ is determined. By Theorem 3.7, one can find a positively equivalent L(σ)-sentence ψ. We claim that they are also negatively equivalent, that is,
+ . The converse follows directly from the determinacy of L(σ). Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Games and partiality
In this and the following section we introduce a propositional language of imperfect information that gives rise to partiality in the same way as the previous language L(W ) with the new connective W . It can be called an IF (independence-friendly) propositional language and it is a sublanguage of Hintikka and Sandu IF first-order languages studied, for example, in [11] , [12] , [13] , [22] , [24] .
Semantic games
The particularities of IF propositional language are the connectives of the form
The idea is that a sentence such as
can be interpreted by a game of imperfect information in which the move corresponding to the slashed disjunction sign is informationally independent of the earlier move in the game prompted by the conjunction sign. The game is described below. It turns out that, under this interpretation, the sentence (4.1) is nothing else than our earlier W (ϕ, ψ, θ, χ). 1 The sentences of a propositional IF language are those of an ordinary propositional language plus the ones which are obtained through the application of the following clause:
With each IF sentence ϕ and each model M we associate a game G(ϕ, M ) played by two players, ∃ (Eloise) and ∀ (Abelard). The game is played according to the following rules:
• ϕ ∨ ψ prompts a choice by ∃ who chooses Left or Right. If Left is chosen, then the game goes on with the sentence ϕ. If Right is chosen, then the game goes on with the sentence ψ.
• ϕ ∧ ψ is identical to ϕ ∨ ψ, except that ∀ makes the choices.
• ¬ϕ prompts a switch of the two players, including the rules for winning and losing below.
by ∀ (resp. ∃), who chooses Left or Right, and the game goes on with the left or right conjunct (disjunct). Then ∃ (resp. ∀) chooses Left or Right, 'independently' of the choice made by ∀ (resp. ∃), and the game goes on with respect to the chosen disjunct (resp. conjunct).
After a finite number of choices, a play of the game reaches an atomic formula p. If p holds in M, then ∃ wins the game. If p does not hold in M , ∀ wins. The notion of an 'independent' choice is codified in the strategies of the players. A strategy for a player in the game G(ϕ, M ) is a set of functions f m , one for each choice m of the respective player in the game. Each function f m is defined on the set of all possible choices chosen in the previous move. In addition, if the choice m is independent of an earlier one, then the strategy function f m has to be uniform. This property means that f m (h) = R for all previous choices h, R being a fixed element of the set from which the choice corresponding to the choice m has to be made (cf. our comments on the extensive form of a game in the next subsection.) We stipulate that:
The sentence ϕ is true in M (M |= GTS ϕ + ) iff there exists a winning strategy for ∃ in G(ϕ, M ).
The sentence ϕ is false in M (M |= GTS ϕ − ) iff there exists a winning strategy for ∀ in G(ϕ, M ).
Let us define a mapping
* between the sentences of an L(W )(σ)-language and those of the propositional IF language of the same signature: 
Proof. By a double induction on the complexity of ϕ. We consider only the case for
. By the inductive hypothesis it holds that: (∃ has a winning strategy in G(ϕ * , M) and a winning strategy in G(θ * , M)) or (∃ has a winning strategy in G(ψ * , M) and a winning strategy in G(χ * , M)). We now describe a winning strategy for ∃ in the game G(, M). Define a uniform function f : {Left, Right} → {Left, Right}, such that:
• f (Left) = f (Right) = Right, if ∃ has a winning strategy in G(M, ψ * ) and a winning strategy in G(M, χ * ).
+ , that is, ∃ has a winning strategy in the corresponding game. This means that there is a uniform function f : {Left, Right} → {Left, Right}, such that ∃ wins both the game where f (Left) and the game where f (Right). By the uniformity of f, f (Left) = f (Right).
There are two possible situations: (a) f (Left) = f (Right) = Left. This means that ∃ is able to win both G(ϕ * , M) and G(θ * , M). By the inductive hypothesis, M |= ϕ
Similar to the previous one.
(ii) The left-to-right direction is immediate. For the right-to-left direction, one has to notice that the existence of a winning strategy for ∀ in the game G((ϕ 
Extensive form games
The games G(ϕ, M ) of imperfect information introduced in the preceding subsection can be represented as a tree structure, with subformulas as nodes and actions as labels for the edges departing from the decision nodes (non-terminal histories). The games in this kind of tree structure are said to be in extensive form.
The game starts at the root of the tree and ends with the terminal nodes. Each node is mapped into a subformula of ϕ. Such labelling falls quite naturally from the description of the rules of the game:
• The root of the tree r is associated with the formula ϕ.
• Each terminal node t ∈ T is associated with an atomic subformula of ϕ or the negation of an atomic subformula.
• If a node n is associated with one of the formulas (
or (ψ (∧/∨) θ), then n has two immediate successors n 1 and n 2 associated with the formulas ψ and θ, respectively. The edge (n, n 1 ) is labelled Left, and the edge (n, n 2 ) is labelled Right.
Each non-terminal node n is also associated with one of the two players ∃ or ∀, which indicates whose turn it is to move at the node in question. The mapping of nodes into {∃, ∀} is a straightforward consequence of the rules of the game, as is the mapping of the nodes of the tree into sets of subformulas of ϕ. We skip these descriptions here.
Each maximal branch of the tree is a possible play (complete history) of the game. It has the form r
where each h i is either Left or Right. The non-terminal histories (that is, the initial segments of the maximal branches of the tree) can further be partitioned into information sets. The histories in the same information set are 'indistinguishable' by the player, a fact reflected in the requirement of the relevant strategy function to be uniform, that is, to have a constant value for the histories belonging to the same information set. A usual method in game theory is to link the histories belonging to the same information set with a dotted line or an oval, as depicted in Figure 1 . The oval in the figure indicates that the histories Left and Right belong to the same information set.
We do not go into further issues about the precise structure of these games. Suffice it to mention that a further analysis of imperfect information games suggests that one is dealing with non-repetitive (non-absentminded) von Neumann-Morgenstern imperfect information and imperfect recall extensive games. In games of perfect recall, players can be said to 'remember' their own past actions or information, and likewise, imperfect recall models players' limited memory or bounded rationality by withdrawing information about player's own previous choices (see [23] ). One should note, however, that the notion of perfect recall (or perfect memory) does not follow from the rationality assumption of players in the case that rationality is something that is incorporated into the game normal forms obtained from extensive games by means of so-called Thompson transformations (see [9] , [27] ). This is because these translations, particularly 'Inflation' and 'Addition', are capable of destroying aspects of perfect recall and can turn a perfect information and perfect recall game into a game where player forgets elements of his or her previous knowledge. In this sense the Thompson transformations cannot be taken to form a basis of a complete calculus for IF propositional logic (as suggested in [3] ), let alone for ordinary propositional logic.
In the game-theoretic interpretation, then, complex sentences can fail to have a determined truth-value due to informational regulation. In partial models, however, one starts with an inductive definition of partiality and generates non-atomic sentences with truth-value gaps only if some atomic propositions in it are undefined. Therefore game-theoretic semantics provides an alternative, theoretically satisfactory way of looking at the phenomenon of partiality, arising as imperfect information occurring in semantic games associated with formulas. The imperfectness of information means that sometimes players have to fix their choice of connectives without having information about their opponent's choices. We formalise such general calculus in the next section, and describe an alternative compositional semantics for it.
Logics with imperfect information

Informationally independent connectives vs. quantifiers
In [12] and [13] an extension of first-order languages was considered (IF first-order languages), with the purpose of having an explicit notation for mutually dependent and independent quantifiers and connectives. The basic new syntactical notion is a quantifier of the form (∃y/∀x), expressing the informational independence of the quantifier ∃y from the quantifier ∀x, within whose syntactic scope it otherwise occurs. Sentences of this kind are interpreted by semantic games of imperfect information, played by two players, ∀ and ∃, who choose individuals of the relevant model corresponding to the quantifiers in the prefix of the sentence, ∀'s choices corresponding to universal quantifiers, and ∃'s choices corresponding to existential quantifiers. The idea behind the slashed quantifiers is that, for instance, the move corresponding to the quantifier (∃y/{z}) is informationally independent of the move corresponding to the quantifier ∀z. As in the case of propositional connectives, the informational independence of the quantifiers is codified in the requirement of uniformity of the corresponding strategy functions. In our example (5.2), the existence of a winning strategy for ∃ in the game associated with the sentence and a model M amounts to the existence of two uniform functions Raf (a, b)bg(a, b, f (a, b) ) holds in M (|M | is the universe of the model M ). Given the uniformity of the functions f and g, it is straightforward to see that the following holds in M :
The extensive forms of the associated games are straightforward. Figure 2 illustrates it for the sentence ∀x∀z(∃y/{z}) Rxzy and a tiny model M whose universe consists of two elements, a and b.
The dotted ovals indicate that the histories a, a and a, b are indistinguishable, and the same holds for the histories b, a and b, b . Thus the corresponding strategy function f for ∃ must be such that
The steps involved in determining the extensive form of a game G(ϕ, M ) can be outlined as follows:
1. Label the nodes of the trees with subformulas of ϕ in a straightforward way. 2. Label the edges of the trees with individuals of the universe of M . 3. A play a 1 . . . a n of the game ending with an atomic formula Rt 1 . . . t n is a win for ∃ if Ra 1 . . . a n holds in M ; otherwise it is a win for ∀. 4. Partition the set of all subhistories whose last node is labelled with the same subformula into information sets. The form of the labelling formula determines the partition. More precisely, let h 1 and h 2 be two subhistories such that their last node is labelled with the same formula, say (∃x n /W ) ϕ(x 0 . . . x n−1 , x n ), where W is a set of variables, x n / ∈ W. Since the game is played only with sentences, it is obvious that h 1 and h 2 have the form h 1 = a 0 . . . a n−1 , h 1 = b 0 . . . b n−1 , respectively. Then we stipulate that h 1 and h 2 belong to the same information set if and only if for all
The strategy functions are uniform, that is, they must be constant on decision nodes within the same information set.
It turns out to be interesting to compare informationally independent connectives with informationally independent quantifiers. For this purpose, let us return to our earlier example with independent disjunctions:
In [14] Hodges pointed out that this kind of informational independence does not make much sense in game-theoretic setting, for after ∀ has made the first move choosing one of the conjuncts, then it is ∃'s turn to move, but when she moves, it is reasonable to require that she knows the set of her possible choices: if she is supposed to choose from the set {ϕ, ψ} then she can realize or infer that before her own move the player ∀ has chosen the left conjunct. If her choice is from the set {θ, χ}, then she may infer that ∀ has chosen the right conjunct. In both cases, the informational independence of ∃'s move from that of ∀ vanishes into thin air! We think that the problem raised by Hodges is profound; however, in the preceding section we were able to circumvent it by introducing a split between, on the one side, the choices made by the players (i.e. the actions of the players), and on the other, the formula with which the game goes on (i.e. the labelling formulas of the game). In the rules for conjunction and disjunction, the players did not have to choose between the left and the right disjunct (conjunct ), but simply between Left or Right, and the game would then go on with the formula which is the left or the right disjunct (conjunct).
Another way of putting the same thing is that the players choose 'blindly': they know that they have to choose between Left and Right, but they do not know, when it is their turn to move, what the formula is which labels the node at which the player is located.
There nonetheless is an essential difference between the games for informationally independent connectives and the games for informationally independent quantifiers. In the latter case, the choices of the players are made from the universe of the relevant model. Moreover, these choices decide whether the play in question is a win or loss, since they comprise the interpretations of the variables of the formula with which the play will end. This is not so for informationally independent propositional logic where players' choices do not belong to the model, and accordingly such choices do not play the same role in deciding whether the play in question is a win or a loss as in the first-order case. This difference has another consequence as well: in the case of informationally independent connectives, there is no equally straightforward way of certifying what the relevant information sets are. We cannot apply the method of partitioning the set of subhistories labelled with the same subformula into information sets, for some of the subhistories that we wanted into the same information set (e.g. Left and Right in Figure 1 ) may actually be labelled by different formulas ((ϕ (∨/∧) ψ) and (θ (∨/∧) χ), respectively). So the partition of subhistories into information sets cannot be decided, in this case, from elements internal to the extensive form of a game.
There is a way, however, to have a uniform treatment of connectives and quantifiers which our games actually strongly suggest. If we look again at Figure 1 , then one obvious way to connect, for example, the history Left, Right with the formula ϕ which labels its last node, is to have ϕ subindexed with variables, say i and j, so that Left and Right are elements from a subdomain of the model which interpret these variables. In this new setting, disjunctions and conjunctions become restricted quantifiers over two-element sets, an idea which indeed occurs in Hodges [14] (cf. [5] ). We will elaborate this in the next subsection.
Propositional connectives as restricted quantifiers
Let us consider a language which is a variant of an IF first-order language, and which generalises our previous remarks about the possibility of having a general propositional logic with various informational independencies. It consists of a stock PROP of propositional symbols, each having its own arity, and a finite set i 1 . . . i n of indices ranging over a set of two elements.
The well-formed formulas of such language L IF are defined by the following clauses: 
The notions of free and bound variables are the same as in first-order logic. In (∃i n /U ) ϕ the indices on the right-hand side of the slash are free. For simplicity, we omit the clauses for dual prefixes such as (∀i n /U ).
The models for the language will be of the form • ϕ ∨ ψ prompts a move by ∃ who chooses ϕ or ψ. The game goes on with the chosen formula.
For sentences ϕ we define
This interpretation is second-order: a formula is interpreted in a model M by the set of its 'trumps' X. It can be easily seen that our compositional semantics agrees with the Hintikka-Sandu semantic games on sentences, that is, for any L IF sentence ϕ (in a negation normal form):
6 Non-strictly competitive games
It should be noted that the game-theoretical treatment of negation as a role change leads to a strong negation. It is possible to introduce a weak, contradictory, classical negation ¬ w into the language L(W ), but it cannot be captured by any game rules. The definition of this negation, repeated here, is the familiar one:
The clause (i) says that the sentence ϕ cannot be verified, and the clause (ii) says that ϕ cannot be falsified. The sentences augmented with weak negation are meta-game-theoretical assertions, they indicate that a winning verifying or a winning falsifying strategy does not exist in a particular game. Consequently, we see that the ensuing four-valuedness of the resulting logic L(W, ¬ w ) has a source in these kinds of assertions about the non-existence of winning strategies for both of the players.
Another way to introduce a fourth truth-value in the logic would be to relax the assumption that games be strictly competitive (zero-sum). In this case a win for one of the players in the game is not automatically a loss for the other player. In such games, call them non-strictly competitive, it may happen that both players have a winning strategy in G(ϕ, M ), for a certain ϕ. One way to implement this idea is to go back to our definition of partial models as pairs M = M + , M − and to relax the assumption that M
Then it is obvious that in cases in which M + ∩ M − = ∅, there will be some terminal nodes in our extensive games which can be winning for both V and F . In these games it may well happen that both players have a winning strategy. One such rather trivial example is provided by G(ϕ, M ), where ϕ is (p ∨ q) ∧ (q ∨ p), and M = {p, q}, {p, q} . The difference with the previous case is that we get the fourth truth-value already in the logic L(W ) without a need of having the extension L(W, ¬ w ).
This game interpretation turns out to be useful in distinguishing between different notions of consistency: although a version of ex falso quodlibet can be tolerable as ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ, it is never the case that ϕ ∧ ¬ w ϕ. For it does not make sense to assert that "there exists a winning strategy for V in ϕ, but there does not exist a winning strategy for V in ϕ", which would express a strong version of inconsistency. Some sentences can be weakly inconsistent or non-coherent, however: there is no principled reason to exclude cases where two players cannot both have winning strategies in the same game. In fact, the possibility of having ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ directly follows from the definition of non-strictly competitive games.
Partiality and situations
In a number of treatments in the literature, partiality is attempted to be explained with reference to the notion of situation derived from situation semantics. Situations may be seen as codifying some information about the world, as a result of which they give support or fail to give support to sentences asserted in those situations. In the former case, the sentences are said to be true, and in the latter case they are said to be false. But a situation can fail to be coherent or complete, whence a sentence can be both true and false, or neither true nor false, respectively. This is a phenomenon which arises already with atomic sentences, and which is then transmitted via the recursive clauses to the complex sentences as well.
The situational approach ordinarily interprets non-classical truth-values as a result of a lack of complete knowledge of the relevant state of the world. The attitude to partiality in the game-theoretic analysis endorsed in this paper is completely different. The knowledge of the world (codified in the relevant model) is assumed to be complete, and the players of the game act within the boundaries of ideal rationality. In the case of propositional logic, partiality is a straightforward consequence of the way players interact with each other in the course of the game. Of course, limitations on the rationality of the players, which play an important role in other areas of game theory, could be also incorporated into game-theoretical semantics. There could be, for instance, bounds to the number of moves a player can 'remember', 'forget' or 'learn' in a semantic game. This line of thought has not been a central one here, and will be pursued elsewhere.
The situational approach and the game-theoretical one could nonetheless be combined. In this case we would have both a lack of complete knowledge of the world resulting in a proper partial model, and a lack of perfect information in the semantic games. This is actually what we have done in the preceding section when we have interpreted the languages L(W ) on partial models where the two relevant sets of sentences are not disjoint. More generally, the combination of the situational and game-theoretical approach would be reasonable for real-domain applications, for example, since no expert knowledge can plausibly specify, for each atomic sentence of the language, whether the sentence should be seen as true or false.
Conclusion
We have studied connections between partiality and games in a propositional context, suggesting a game-theoretic interpretation of propositional connectives. In this setting, the interpretation of sentences denoting the truth-values ? (neither true nor false) or ! (both true and false) is not a result of partial knowledge of the players with respect to the model which interprets the nonlogical vocabulary of these sentences. These semantic values are the consequences of what can happen in semantic games played with these sentences: the two players whose purpose is to verify or falsify a given sentence by a method of seeking and finding of suitable actions may both fail to do so (partiality), or they may both succeed in doing so, giving rise to weak inconsistence or non-coherence. 2 The evaluation process of the sentences is intimately connected to the players' use of strategic resources; consequently, the downright ex-istence or nonexistence of suitable strategies cannot be taken for granted.
Take the strong game negation, for example, which expresses the change in the strategic positions of the players. If classical negation is not present, which cannot be captured by game rules anyway, the failure of determinacy has a consequence of nil est tertium. This kind of 'non-classical' logic is the product of entirely natural assumptions about the game, not expressing anything about the underlying logic in particular. On the other side, if both players can have a winning strategy, then we can see how another 'non-classical' logic suddenly emerges. Moreover, such non-strictly competitive games are utterly realistic in a number of strategic and cooperative situations, such as in bargaining games, evolutionary game theory, differential games, prisoners dilemma and so on. Although the game rules in both cases are the same (with the minor exception that in non-strictly competitive games, atomic formulas can yield non-zero sum 'payoffs'), these logics arise primarily just by regulating the flow of information between the players in a game. In particular, the general informationally independent propositional logic studied in this paper provides an illustrative example of a logic that arises from (a special form of) imperfect information.
